by the traits of one type, although traits of the other appear at times. Distinguishing which is which is purely a matter of subjective categorization and judgment.

During evaluation of families at the Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute project, I sometimes hear observers say something that sounds like "eecch." This, I think, may often be the reaction to the slippery family; at other times I hear something like "Wow!" which expresses the observer's spontaneous reaction to the tough category of relational pattern.

With the slippery family the therapist is urged constantly to push the members to make points. With the tough one the therapist's main problem is to draw from his emotional reserves just to be able to withstand the enormous outpouring of murderous or otherwise shocking assaults.

Both of these types are conspicuously different from the ideally healthy family, if there is such, in which there is a genuine dialogue of persons who are committed to themselves as selves, each interacting with the others in recognition of his own selfhood.

The only thing I should like to add at this point is that, in my experience, the type of family I have labeled tough is likely to move more quickly in therapy. It has a definitely better prospect for change than the type designated slippery.

Patterns of Relations: Types of Types

Victor J. Gioscia

I am much taken with the presentations made by Dr. Brodey and Dr. Nagy, in that both of them emphasize and work toward a conceptualization of family types by the way families move, by the way they change, by what I call temporal dynamics—metaphorically, the music, rhythm, paces, cycles, tempos, keys, and signatures of family life.

Similar metaphors form the basis of the classification schemes I shall present here. As an aid to understanding these schemes, I suggest that, instead of thinking of "things," "bits," "particles," and the like, one should look for *particular* patterns of relations

and then for *types* of patterns of relations in what follows. A relation is customarily visualized as a line drawn between two points. Try, instead, to conceptualize a relation as an affective pattern, embodying modes of feeling, ways of sharing emotion—feeling with, feeling for, feeling against, and so on. Using time and emotion as the basis, I shall try to show that there are a number of possible bases for classification schemes and family typologies.

First a word about the intersection of clinical and social science. I say *intersection* because the word describes the fact that the two fields overlap, but not entirely; and sometimes the overlap is only narrow and temporary. The behavioral scientists—anthropologists, sociologists, and social psychologists—have tried to conceptualize the family system as a small-group system, but what is frequently missing in these nonclinical systems of classification is a strong focus on the relation of time and feeling. Clinical data have rich temporal and emotional atmospheres, and in what follows I have attempted, with an eye toward sociological generalization, to restrict myself to clinical data. That is to say, I am attempting to make sociological sense out of clinically derived, clinically processed, and clinically useful data.

Not all the following classification schemes endeavor to convey patterns of relations. In my view, there are at least four kinds of typologies that are customarily derived by relying on four root intuitions: part, whole, space, and time. About these last two, Freud, in one of his few but customarily brilliant departures into philosophy, said, approximately, that only unconscious mental processes are an exception to Immanuel Kant's theorum that we seem not to be able to free ourselves of the necessity to think basically in *either* spatial *or* temporal modalities.[5] These four root intuitions—part, whole, space, and time—are constantly being used as basic metaphors. Figure 1 shows what happens if they are plotted against each other.

Someone who is accustomed to thinking spatially, "one part at a time," is referred to in philosophical language as an "atomist."

[5] Sigmund Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," in James Strachey (ed.), *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. XVIII (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953—), p. 28; *see also* Sigmund Freud, "New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis," in *ibid*, Vol. XXII, p. 74.

FIGURE 1
MODES OF CLASSIFICATION

	Space	Time
Part	I Particle	III Instant
Whole	II Gestalt	IV Process

Similarly, the "particle-ist" is a man who thinks that things consist of a sum total of component parts. So, for example, to him a family would consist of the sum total of family members. I will refer to this style of typologizing as Type I.

He is followed by Type II (these are sequential styles of thought, I would claim), the person who also thinks in a fundamentally spatial way, but takes the entire configuration all at once; he is called a "gestaltist." For him things do not consist of a sum total of their parts—a molecule is a molecule; one can break it up into its component atoms, but while one has *it, it* is a molecule. According to this view, a family is a system; one should not reduce it to its component parts. The family is not the arithmetical sum of component parts; it is a *family*.

Type III, the "instant-ist," takes time-parts—that is, "instants" of family process—as his focus. He likes the phrase *one at a time.* But where is an instant? Where is "*at* a time"? The sympathy between the instant-ist and the particle-ist becomes apparent here, for an instant-ist is a temporal kind of particle-ist.

The Type IV theorist also makes use of a temporal intuition, but he likes to take the entirety of the temporal event. He can be called a "processual-ist." He is interested in the family process, the whole family in its temporal dynamics. Drs. Brodey and Nagy both seem to represent this school, if I may so classify them.

Marital Types

Now, before presenting the basis for a processual typology, let us review some widely used bases and try to ascertain upon which of the above metaphors they call. First, let us examine a Freudian paradigm. Freud designated certain people as character types—

the oral, anal, phallic, latent, and genital characters, but he did not examine or treat marital pairs extensively. If, instead of thinking of character types in isolation, marital pairs are plotted, it can be seen in Figure 2 that there are twenty-five possible types of Freudian marital pairs.

FIGURE 2
TYPES OF MARITAL PAIRS

Female \ Male	TYPE	Oral	Anal	Phallic	Latent	Genital
	Oral	1				a
	Anal		2			
	Phallic			3		
	Latent				4	
	Genital	b				5

By examining marriages of Types 1–5, in which both members of the marital pair are of the same character type, and judging their "health," we could test the hypothesis that people who are characterologically similar will marry well and form healthy marriages. We could also test whether the largest amount of characterological *difference* between character types results in a "healthy" marriage by finding couples who satisfy the requisites of boxes "a" or "b," in which one of the pair has an oral character and the other a genital character (if such a pair were discoverable) and then ascertain their "health."

The difficulty with all this is that although we now have twenty-five marital pair-types, no children, intergenerational relationships, ethnicity, or culture are specified, nor is any social structure indicated. These are marital pairs, but they are not (yet) families. Unfortunately, Freud did not directly observe the actual *interaction* of such characters. Hence, Type I theorizing does not seem especially helpful. It is, in short, a psychological atomism.

The classifier who works by constructing such pairs is a "part" thinker; he thinks in terms of one relatively isolated character at

a time. To attempt to build family types out of these original characters would be committing the logical fallacy of saying that a family consists of the sum total of its parts.

According to Freud, "oral," "anal," and "phallic" are zonal (spatial) metaphors. Erikson, however, developed the notion of "mode," which I find somewhat more congenial to the temporal metaphors that are my predilection.[6] He distinguishes, in the maturational process of the individual, five modes: (1) incorporative, (2) incisive, (3) retentive, (4) eliminative, and (5) male intrusive (female inclusive). These modes are said to be characteristic ways in which persons "prefer" to behave, that is, experience process. Each of the modal characteristics may occur in each of the five stages of psychosocial development. Plotting the stages against the modes, we arrive at Figure 3.

FIGURE 3

TYPES OF BEHAVIOR AS EXTRAPOLATED FROM FREUD AND ERIKSON

Mode

	TYPE	Incorporative	Incisive	Retentive	Eliminative	Intrusive (Inclusive)
	Oral					
Stage	Anal					
	Phallic					
	Latent					
	Genital					

Each of the five stages can have five modes. Thus, there can be incorporative, incisive, retentive, eliminative, or intrusive modes of behavior in each of the five stages. What this means, in effect, is that one must recognize that there are five types of orality, five types of anality, five types of phallicity, five types of latency, and five types of genitality. The 25 personality types derived in this way may now be combined in 625 types of marital pairs. However, this still excludes the children and grandparents. To correct

[6] Erik H. Erikson, *Identity and the Life Cycle* (New York: International Universities Press, 1959); and Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1950), Chapter 2.

that deficit, the figure might then be multiplied by 25 possible types of children, giving us 15,625 family types (for those families, that is, that have only one child). I think the point is demonstrated that whether this is taken modally (gestaltically) or not, the number has already become clinically unmanageable, since it seems unlikely that clinicians will attempt to distinguish among 15,625 family types.

Stages of the Life Cycle

The next chart, Figure 4, is an eightfold one. It is the familiar depiction of identity and the life cycle according to which there are eight stages through which the child must go in order to live through his entire life. (Birth and death are "outside" the chart.)

These eight stages may each be divided into the five modes. But it is well to note that, according to Erikson, as one experiences the eight stages of man, certain sociological processes are required. The requisite of the first stage is "mothering," of the second stage, "parenting," and of the third stage, "basic exemplary family." What, however, is a "basic exemplary family"?

Toward a Typology of Families

The difficulty with all these approaches to classification is that each of these models is reductive. Each of these typologies attempts to take personalities, add them together, and predict what the resultant family configuration will be like. Even Type III theorizing leaves many questions open. And, despite the magnificence of his theoretical efforts, Erikson does not attempt to treat the family; he does not "do" family therapy.

I can barely hint at the work that we at Jewish Family Service are trying to do to rectify the fractionalism of existing approaches and to devise a way in which a clinically useful typology of families may come about. It is clear that I prefer Type IV typologizing, that is, searching for *process* models. For this, family movement through time is needed. Therefore, we study family films.

When family therapy sessions are filmed, a moving record is achieved. We study the modes as defined by Erikson, in their

FIGURE 4

IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
VIII	Maturity								Ego Integrity vs. Despair
VII	Adulthood							Generativity vs. Stagnation	
VI	Young Adulthood						Intimacy vs. Isolation		
V	Puberty and Adolescence					Identity vs. Role Confusion			
IV	Latency				Industry vs. Inferiority				
III	Locomotor-Genital			Initiative vs. Guilt					
II	Muscular-Anal		Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt						
I	Oral-Sensory	Basic Trust vs. Mistrust							

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familial contexts, as they occur in temporal patterns: the cycles, rhythms, rates, and sequences that characterize family life in time. We call these family "modalities."

Let me give an example. If a family therapy session lasts approximately an hour, and if careful examination of that session reveals that every attempt at intervention on the part of the therapist is greeted by an interactive sequence of defenses, this interaction can be termed a "defense coalition." For example, a father may attempt to join the therapist in an interpretation by pointing an accusing finger at someone he feels to be a deviate member and saying, "Yes, he's quite right; you really are that way." This behavior is then followed by a shrinking and pulling back on the part of the accused member, whereupon another family member, the "family healer," attempts to mediate this dispute, which, in his mind, has been provoked by the therapist. Therapeutic intervention is thus sabotaged.

This modality, or pattern of defenses, may recur four or five times during one session. My desire is to examine the timing with which people in families go through such recurrent defensive cycles. Noting such patterns in single sessions gives what might be called a "mood curve." We hope to find, after two or three years, that such constellations of defenses "shrink" in their temporality, that the cyclicity of the coalitions changes, and that the basic mood curve of the family alters its configuration. That is, we are also looking for *patterns of modalities.*

Mood swings and their relation to defensive coalitions are one kind of Type IV investigation now under way. We are also doing some new theoretical work in which the relations between modes of temporal experience and modes of feeling are being investigated. But that work will have to be reported at another time.

Reaction to the Discussion

Israel Zwerling

I can only react with concern to the fact that the issues that have been pointed to are acknowledged to an overwhelmingly greater degree in the breach than in the observance. It was said